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"The past is never dead. It's not even past." William Faulkner
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College freshmen have no personal knowledge of the Cold War. Born after the Berlin Wall’s fall and the
Soviet Union’s collapse, the threat of nuclear Armageddon seems far removed from their experiences, a
relic of a bygone age. Yet, today, more countries than ever hold weapons whose scale of destruction can
dwarf that of every bomb used in World War II. As the Cold War nuclear arms race recedes from
collective memory, it is important to remember why the world remains beneath the shadow of the
mushroom cloud.
This October 11th and 12th, the world observed the 25th anniversary of the summit between U.S.
President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik, Iceland in 1986,
where the leaders of the world’s superpowers contemplated the abolition of nuclear weapons. The talks
remain the closest humanity has come to stopping the accumulation and proliferation of nuclear arms.
Twenty-five years later, historians still debate the summit’s legacy. Even if the nuclear colossi had
adopted Gorbachev’s plan to disarm in three stages by 2000, only their fine example would have
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persuaded Great Britain, France, China, India, and Israel to join them. Reading the minutes of the four
meetings at Reykjavik, it is also unclear if gravity bombs like the ones that destroyed Hiroshima and
Nagasaki would have been eliminated. Nevertheless, during those two autumn days, Reagan and
Gorbachev neared the brink of a nuclear-free world, only to turn back in defeat.
It seems, ironically, that Reagan’s abhorrence of nuclear weapons scuttled the talks. As president,
Reagan made research and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), an anti-missile shield
derisively known as “Star Wars,” a centerpiece of his strategic policy. Nuclear abolitionists condemned the
project as a multi-billion dollar boondoggle and a slippery slope toward normalizing the military use of
nuclear weapons. Strategists weaned on the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction warned that
its construction could prompt the Soviet Union to launch a preemptive first strike. For Reagan, SDI
represented a means by which to make nuclear weapons obsolete and an insurance policy if a “madman”
ever got his hands on them. Gorbachev disagreed, and saw limits on SDI as indispensible if the USSR
was to trust its rival to disarm.
At Reykjavik, Soviet and American negotiators smoothed over rough spot after rough spot, agreeing to
limits and sub-limits on an array of nuclear delivery systems—bombs, cruise missiles, sub-launched,
medium-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. More progress was made in 36 hours than the
previous 15 years combined. Paul Nitze, the president’s special adviser on arms control and a fixture in
U.S. foreign policymaking throughout the Cold War, remarked Soviet concessions were “the best we have
received in 25 years.” When Reagan and Gorbachev began their fourth and final meeting, they knew the
stakes: an historic agreement for deep arms cuts and eventual disarmament. They also knew the final
and toughest challenge; how to finesse Reagan’s steely support for SDI and Gorbachev’s stand that the
U.S. confine R&D to the labs.
Initial expectations for Reykjavik had been modest. Recurrent crises had beset U.S.-Soviet relations since
Reagan took office. The White House’s more confrontational tone, the shooting down of a wayward
Korean airliner over Soviet territory, the deployment of quick-strike missiles in Europe, and an alarming
NATO nuclear exercise codenamed Able Archer, compounded an already fraught relationship. However,
conditions eventually improved. Reagan assumed a more conciliatory line so as to facilitate arms control
initiatives and lessen the chances of an accidental nuclear exchange. It was Gorbachev’s rise to power in
1985, however, that transformed the tenor of the Cold War by infusing new life into a listless Soviet
system. Following a series of three elderly statesmen whose best days were behind them, he was
confronted by an economic system with chronic shortages and, in April 1986, a catastrophic meltdown of
the nuclear reactor at Chernobyl, Ukraine. Gorbachev insisted that “new thinking” be applied to the
USSR’s manifold problems, and espoused the policies of perestroika, restructuring the Soviet economy,
and glasnost, making the government more open and responsive. A major element of perestroika was
redirecting the river of resources flowing into the state’s military-industrial complex, especially the secret
agencies managing the USSR’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs, to more productive
ends. Unable and unwilling to keep pace with U.S. military spending, Gorbachev instead offered a three-
step plan to liquidate the superpowers’ nuclear weapons.
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It was a bold initiative, but Gorbachev’s labors were close to bearing fruit when he and Reagan sat down
for their last tête-à-tête. Reagan promised to share advances in missile defense with the Soviets.
Gorbachev fired back that the U.S. had thus far been unwilling to share even industrial and agricultural
technology with his country. Just when the statesmen seemed to have exhausted their cases,
Gorbachev’s foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, urged them to cross the finish line, declaring they
had “come very close to accomplishing this historic task … [a]nd when future generations read the record
… they will not forgive us if we let this opportunity slip by.” Despite Shevardnadze’s appeal, however,
Reagan and Gorbachev failed to agree on the wording of the final text. The two negotiating parties left
Reykjavik without an agreement.
Sadly, subsequent generations have more often forgotten than condemned the talks. The calamity of
climate change is more familiar to our undergraduates than the firestorm of nuclear war and the long night
of the ensuing nuclear winter. In the 1980s, scientists theorized that only 200 thermonuclear explosions
would kick up a planetary shroud of radioactive dust, lowering temperatures enough to recreate the
climactic conditions in which the dinosaurs died off. Five countries—the U.S., Russia, Great Britain,
France, and China—have more than 200 warheads. The U.S. and Russia are currently reducing their
arsenals to 1,550 deliverable warheads. A conflict between India and Pakistan, who fought four wars
since 1947, where nuclear weapons were used would jeopardize the continuation of life, as we know it.
Current global affairs hardly resemble the global situation in 1986 when two nuclear-armed superpowers
testily eyed one another. Yet some themes have reoccurred. Just as the Soviet Union fiscal emergency
forced Gorbachev to offer a plan to nuclear disarmament, today’s financial crisis could pave the way for
deep multilateral arms cuts. The nuclear disaster at Fukushima, Japan augurs lessons similar to those of
Chernobyl regarding the uncontrollable nature of nuclear power. It remains for the leaders of today to take
advantage of their window of opportunity.
For two days on a remote archipelago in the North Atlantic, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed the
entwined destinies of the Cold War and nuclear arms. As educators, we must remind our students of such
moments, when history conspires to grant individuals the occasion to re-route its course. Reykjavik’s
great tragedy is not its failure; after all, the negotiations paved the way for two momentous treaties—the
1987 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Its
tragedy resides in its potential disappearance from our collective memory. For our students’ generation
will have to address this dangerous legacy of the Cold War—even if they don’t remember it.
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